No one be lieves in his own death. Or, to put the same thing in an other way, in the un conscious ev ery one of us is con vinced of his own im mor tal ity.
1
Holding to the truth of death-death is always most/just [one's] own-shows another kind of cer tainty, more pri mor dial than any cer tainty re gard ing be ings encoun tered within the world or for mal objects; for it is the cer tainty of be ing-in-the-world. 2 
Mar tin Heidegger, Be ing and Time
In this open ing prov o ca tion, Freud and Heidegger make as ser tions which stand, prima fa cie , in ex treme op po si tion to one another 3 -with Derrida sit u ated, not sur pris ingly, some where in-be tween . 4 But be tween what? What is the philo soph i cal sig nif i cance of the cogni tive re la tion one stands in with re spect to one's own death? Be tween (1) Heidegger's as ser tion that hold ing onto the truth of death re veals the pri mor dial cer tainty of be ing-in-the-world and (2) the uni ver sal, al beit un con scious con vic tion that I will not die which Freud di ag no ses as a com mon fea ture of the hu man psy che , the skep ticism Derrida's ques tion ex presses ini tially strikes one as very strange. But is it unheimlich ? Is it ca pa ble of driv ing us from our home in the famil iar? This re mains to be seen.
Can we be cer tain of death? Not of what might hap pen af ter death, 5 but of the brute "fact" [Faktum ] that each of us will meet with his or her own death? For Freud, none of us has such certainty. We all say "I know I am go ing to die," but deep down, be hind the one-way mir ror of the uncon scious, the ar chi val re pos i tory of the repressed, none of us be lieves it. (As though "bearing wit ness" 6 to Freud's claim, An tony Flew's A Dic tio nary of Phi los o phy con tains un der the head ing "death" only the fol low ing en try: " See sur vival and im mor tal ity.") 7 For Heidegger, on the other hand, death is more cer tain-or better, is cer tain in a more "pri mor dial" [ ursprüngliche ] way-than epistemic cer tainty (know ing that there is a com puter in front of me, or even that, to para phrase Moore, "this is a hand") or even cogni tive cer tainty (that, for ex am ple, the sum of the in te rior an gles of a tri an gle equals one hun dred and eighty de grees). Heidegger is no skep tic; for him, "hold ing to the truth of death"-which as we will see means main tain ing our selves in the unconcealedness of the phe nom e non of our own death-re veals a cer tainty which is ab so lutely ba sic to the to tal ity of lived con texts con sti tut ing worldly in tel li gi bil ity. As a be ing-in-the-world, Dasein dies; there is noth ing more cer tain: " More orig i nal than man is the fini tude of the Dasein within him ." 8 If, ac cord ingly, Heidegger and Freud are taken as pro vid ing two ex treme char ac ter iza tions of the cog ni tive re la tion one stands in with respect to one's own death, then it be comes eas ier to imag ine why Derrida might ask such a strange-per haps unheimlich -ques tion; for this seems to be an ir rec on cil able op po si tion, an either/or of the type no to ri ously most vul ner a ble to Derrida's deconstructions . Thus, when Derrida asks, "Is my death pos si ble?" he is not sim ply spec u lat ing as to whether one can be cer tain of death's ob tain ing; his is a more rad i cal ques tioning: Can I die? Is it even pos si ble for me to die? Can I meet with death? In what sense can death hap pen to me-can "it" "hap pen" to "me" at all?
De cons truc tion: Tying the Knot Tighter 9
Aporias , a re cent ad di tion in a long line of Derrida's in ter pre ta tions of Heidegger's thinking, is surely best heard as speak ing out of the rich her i tage of that lin eage. 10 It is thus not without rea son that I use Freud to in tro duce a pa per on the re la tion ship be tween Derrida and Heidegger, a re la tion ship marked by dif fer ences which I take to be best char ac ter ized as gen er a tional . This asser tion would sur prise Derrida least of all, who de scribes his Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger as gen er a tional, 11 and thus as a gen er ational al ter-cation . 12 It should not be too sur prising, then, that when Derrida turns to con sider the pos si bil ity of "my death," it is Heidegger's thinking-Heidegger's ghost as well as his Geist -that he finds him self con front ing. In an in ter view given to The New York Times Mag azine (Jan u ary 23, 1994), just af ter the Eng lish trans la tion of Aporias was pub lished, Derrida said: "All of my writ ing is on death. If I don't reach the place where I can be rec on ciled with death, then I have failed. If I have one goal, it is to ac cept death and dy ing." 13 Given the cen tral role Heidegger's thought plays in Aporias , it is hard to avoid the con clu sion that Heidegger has come be tween Derrida and his death.
14 Thus, in the early pages of Aporias , be fore explic itly in vok ing Heidegger, Derrida writes, "con cern ing the thresh old of death, we are engaged here to ward a cer tain pos si bil ity of the impos si ble" (pp. 11, cf. 4). This "pos si bil ity of the im pos si ble" is, of course, a para phrase of the famous for mula Heidegger re peats at sev eral crucial mo ments in Di vi sion Two of Be ing and Time as a phenomenological def i ni tion of death. At what could be taken as the zero-point of his proxim ity to Heidegger, Derrida (re)de fines "de construc tion . . . as a cer tain aporetic ex pe ri ence of the im pos si ble" (p. 15). 15 It should es cape no one's no tice that this def i ni tion of de cons truc tion is nearly iden ti cal with Heidegger's phenomenological def i ni tion of death (as the "pos si bil ity of an im pos si bil ity"), with " aporetic ex pe ri ence" sub sti tuted for "pos si bil ity."
16 These gen er a tion proxemics turn, then, around Derrida's in ter pre ta tion of the pos si bil ity of death as an aporetic ex pe ri ence.
Death as an Aporetic Pos si bil ity
Derrida's Aporias is a long and com plex paper; its for mal oc ca sion was a July 1992 con ference on bor der cross ings. 17 Its cen tral theme, the aporia , can be un der stood as one of the lat est thematic re fine ments of the think ing em bod ied reflex ively in his strat e gies of performative writ ing. His is less an ex plicit the ory than a phi los o phy of im pli ca tion; to ar tic u late his own " aporetology or aporetography " (p. 15), Derrida hunts down basic " aporias ," sites of " im pos si ble but nec es sary pas sage " at the heart of Heidegger's ex is ten tial an a lytic. As Derrida thinks through 18 the "aporias , par a doxes, or log i cal co nun drums" of Heidegger's phenomeno logical anal y sis of death, he de vel ops his own pro jects of thought "in the mar gins" of Be ing and Time , trav el ing back and forth be tween tex tual ex e ge sis and self-elaboration. 19 Here Derrida fol lows Heidegger's thought-path with the rigor of a reflex ivi ty so crit i cal it seems at times al most to par a lyze the logic of its own un fold ing. Wittgenstein once said that phi los o phy is like a kind of bi cy cle race the point of which is to go as slowly as pos si ble with out fall ing off. Derrida's sty lis tic ada gio is cer tainly grace ful, but whether or not he "falls off" re mains to be seen.
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As a cri tique of Heidegger's in ter pre ta tion of death, Aporias ex tends a strat egy fa mil iar from 1968's " Ousia and Grammê ," where Derrida called into ques tion the dis tinc tion be tween authen tic and com mon (or "vul gar") tem po ral ity, a ques tion which he now re it er ates and ex tends, ask ing:
What if there was no other con cept of time than the one Heidegger calls "vul gar"? What if, conse quently, op pos ing an other con cept to the "vul gar" con cept were it self im prac ti ca ble, nonviable , and im pos si ble? What if it was the same for death, for a vul gar con cept of death? (p. 14)
If "the dis tinc tion be tween death [ der Tod ] or prop erly dy ing [ eigentlich sterben ]" and "per ishing" [ verenden ] 21 were com pro mised, weak ened, or parasited on both sides of what it is sup posed to dis so ci ate . . . then (and you can guess that I am head ing toward such a pos si bil ity) the en tire pro ject of the anal y sis of Dasein, in its es sen tial conceptuality, would be, if not dis cred ited, granted an other sta tus than the one gen er ally attrib uted to it. (p. 31-32) Note Derrida's fun da men tal am biv a lence, never re solved, about the aims of his text. Will "the aporetic ex pe ri ence of death"-the ex pe ri ence of death as a limit that can not but nev er the less must be crossed-"dis credit" the ex is ten tial an a lytic, or will it re pose it, grant ing it an other sta tus?
Un like Derrida, I will take a side as to which of the above aims Aporias in fact achieves. The more se vere al ter na tive-Derrida's claim that his de cons truc tion might "dis credit" "the en tire project of the anal y sis of Dasein"-is un ten a ble, based as it is on the dou ble mis read ing of a sub tle se man tic slip page and a modal fal lacy. 22 On the other hand, I take it that the (less crit i cal but more am bi tious) al ter na tive-that Derrida's "read ing" grants to the ex is ten tial an a lytic a sta tus other than "the one gen er ally at trib uted to it"-succeeds bril liantly, open ing up a pow er ful and provoc a tive new read ing of Be ing and Time .
23 Explaining why Derrida's de cons truc tion fails in its aim to im plode ut terly "and lead to ruin" the archi tec tonic struc ture of Heidegger's anal y sis, I will de velop sev eral threads of this other read ing of the ex is ten tial an a lytic.
24

Dif fer ent Pos si bil ities
Derrida's deconstructive read ing en deav ors to "bring to light sev eral aporias " in the phenomenological in ter pre ta tion of death, as that in ter pre ta tion is ex pressed in Heidegger's as sertion that: "Death is the pos si bil ity of the very impos si bil ity of Dasein."
25 Derrida writes that in Being and Time :
There are sev eral modalized oc cur rences of this nu clear prop o si tion. It is of ten cited. How ever, its grip ping par a dox is hardly noted, and the impor tance of all the suc ces sive ex plo sions that it holds in re serve, in the un der ground of the ex isten tial anal y sis, is prob a bly not mea sured. . . . What can the pos si bil ity of an im pos si bil ity be? How can we think that? How can we say it while re spect ing logic and mean ing? How can we approach that, live, or ex ist it? How does one testify to it? (p. 68)
It is in deed an in trigu ing as ser tion upon which to fo cus; for, as Heidegger says in an other con text: "The sen tence is easy to read but dif fi cult to think." 26 To be gin with, what Heidegger means by "pos si bil ity" [ Möglichkeit ]-in "the pos si bility of an im pos si bil ity"-is by no means straightfor ward. Derrida rec og nizes that "a cer tain thinking of the pos si ble is at the heart of the ex is ten tial anal y sis of death" (p. 62) 27 and he is cor rect that Heidegger's un der stand ing of death turns on his dis tinc tive (and pe cu liar) un der stand ing of pos sibil ity. 28 Nev er the less, his con clu sion-that "one can turn what is thus at the very heart of the pos sibil ity of the ex is ten tial anal y sis against the whole ap pa ra tus of Be ing and Time , against the very pos si bil ity of the ex is ten tial anal y sis" (p. 77)-is based on a sub tle but im por tant mis read ing.
In this mis read ing, Derrida notes that "the essence of Dasein as en tity is pre cisely the pos si bility , the be ing-possible ( das Möglichsein )" (p. 63). From this he in fers that "if be ing-possible is the be ing proper to Dasein , then the ex is ten tial anal y sis of the death of Dasein will have to make of this pos si bil ity its theme" (ibid.).
29 By for mulat ing this claim con di tion ally, Derrida ex presses rhe tor i cally a cau tion which I take to be por tentous; for, fail ing to ad e quately char ac ter ize Heidegger's dis tinc tive sense of "ex is ten tial possi bil ity," Derrida sub sti tutes Möglichsein for Seinkönnen , a se man tic glissement which then al lows him to at trib ute to Heidegger an un ten a ble re li ance on the im pos si ble ex pe ri ence of death as such . 30 This calls for some ex pla na tion. Derrida claims that "two mean ings of pos sibil ity co-exist in die Möglichkeit " (p. 62). The first is " vir tu ality " or "im mi nence," the sec ond "abil ity," in the sense of ca pa bil ity , "pos si bil ity as that of which I am ca pa ble, that for which I have the power, the abil ity, or the po ten ti al ity" (ibid.). This char ac ter iza tion is in suf fi cient and po ten tially mis lead ing. Heidegger dis tin guishes his own use of pos si bil ity, ex is ten tial pos si bil ity , from two other un der stand ings of pos si bil ity com mon to the philo soph i cal tra di tion, namely, log i cal and categorial pos si bil ity; as an existentiale of Dasein, pos si bil ity is con sti tu tive of Dasein's be ing. Ex is ten tial pos si bil ity is "the most pri mor dial and ul ti mately pos i tive way in which Dasein is char ac ter ized."
31 Here Heidegger has not sim ply in verted the mil lennium-old Ar is to te lian dis tinc tion ac cord ing to which ac tu al ity is granted meta phys i cal pri macy of place over pos si bil ity; ac cord ing to Heidegger's think ing of "ex is ten tial pos si bil ity," Dasein ex ists through the con stant chart ing of "live-options," choices that mat ter. Ex is ten tial pos si bil i ties are what Dasein forges ahead into: the roles, iden ti ties, and com mit ments which shape and cir cum scribe the re flex ive com portment of Dasein as a "thrown pro ject." Heidegger's dis tinc tive sense of ex is ten tial pos sibil ity is, he later says, best un der stood as en -abling pos si bil ity, as "what en ables" us to be what we are. 32 Heidegger fur ther spec i fies that ex is ten tial pos si bil ity does not sig nify pos si bil ity in the Kantian sense of "ca pa bil ity": that which I could but may or may not choose to do. 33 Derrida's equa tion of ex is ten tial pos si bil ity with "ca pa bility" is mis lead ing, then, in so far as ex is ten tial pos si bil ity does not de scribe-ex cept in de riv ative "break down states"-our stand ing back in a de tached the o ret i cal pose, de lib er at ing over which pos si ble out come to "ac tu al ize."
34 That Derrida has taken a wrong step be comes clear in an other con text when he as serts that "ev ery re lation to death is an in ter pre tive ap pre hen sion and a rep re sen ta tive ap proach to death." 35 Ex is ten tial pos si bil ity, on the con trary, de scribes our on going non-calculative "chart ing the course" of live op tions in which we are al ways al ready immersed. 36 Even im mi nence , which Derrida does well to em pha size as an ineliminable con stit u ent of the phe nom en ol ogy of death, will be mis under stood if thought of as the the o ret i cal grasp ing of an im pend ing event rather than as the encroach ing of an in def i nite ho ri zon within which we em body pos si bil i ties. Liv ing through pos sibil i ties rather than grasp ing them the o ret i cally, Dasein " is its pos si bil i ties as pos si bil i ties." 37 This is why Heidegger char ac ter izes Dasein as a "being-possible" [ Möglichsein ] .
Death and Fu tu rity
Heidegger brings in Dasein's fu tu rity to contrast this "be ing-possible" with Dasein's "ability-to-be" [ More over, and this is the closely re lated modal fal lacy Derrida com mits, Heidegger does not assert that death is im pos si ble, only that it is pos sibly im pos si ble.
42 This dif fer ence be comes cru cial when we re mem ber Heidegger's claim that, "As be ing-possible [ Möglichsein ] . . . Dasein is existen tially that which, in its abil ity-to-be [Seinkönnen ], it is not yet ." 43 Since it is "ability-to-be" [ Seinkönnen ] rather than "being-possible" [ Möglichsein ] that re ceives elab ora tion "in con junc tion with the out er most pos si bil ity of death," Dasein em bod ies the pos sibil ity of an im pos si bil ity only as some thing which it is not yet . "Be ing to wards one's ownmost abil ity-to-be [ i.e. , death] means that in each case Dasein is al ready ahead of it self." 44 Heidegger holds that as be ing-toward-death I am ahead of my self, able-to-be what I am not yet. How is this to be un der stood?
In 1928, Heidegger is clear; this seem ingly strange "be ing ahead of my self, able-to-be what I
am not yet" is in fact sim ply an ac cu rate phenomenological de scrip tion of our ba sic ex peri ence of fu tu rity:
Ex pect ing [ Gewärtigen ] is . . . ec static [from ek-stasis , "step ping out"]. Expectance im plies a be ing-ahead-of-oneself. It is the ba sic form of the to ward-oneself. . . . Expectance means under stand ing one self from out of one's own ability-to-be . . . . This ap proach ing one self in advance, from one's own pos si bil ity, is the pri mary ec static con cept of the fu ture. We can il lus trate this struc ture, in so far as this is pos sible at all, in this way (the ques tion mark in dicates the ho ri zon that re mains open):
Heidegger's im plicit claim about the struc ture of fu tu rity and its re la tion to pos si bil ity is that Dasein, through its abil ity-to-be, pro jects it self
In sert DI A GRAM ahead of it self, open ing the "ho ri zon" of the futural " ecstasis ," the phe nom e nal space within which we com port and un der stand our selves futurally . The ex is ten tial pos si bil i ties we "press for ward into" or "pro ject our selves upon" (teaching class, mak ing din ner, etc.) re turn back to us as who we are (a pro fes sor, a hus band, etc.). Dasein's " disclosedness " is con sti tuted ac cording to this " ecstematic unity of the ho ri zons of tem po ral ity."
How ever, it is a well known but lit tle un derstood fact that in this im plic itly tri par tite structure Heidegger priv i leges fu tu rity: 46 What do we mean by the horizonal char ac ter of the ecstases ? . . . The be ing-carried-away as such . . . pro vides . . . fu tu rity as such, i.e., pos sibil ity pure and sim ple. Of it self the ecstasis [futu rity] . . . pro duces the ho ri zon of pos si bil ity in gen eral. . . . The ho ri zon man i fests it self in and with the ecstasis ; it is its ecstema . . . . And, corre spond ing to the unity of the ecstases in their temporalization , the unity of the ho ri zons is a pri mor dial unity. This ecstematic unity of the ho ri zon of tem po ral ity is noth ing other than the tem po ral con di tion for the pos si bil ity of world .
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It is as gath er ing this " ecstematic " unity of the ho ri zons of tem po ral ity that Dasein "ex ists" (from " ek-sistere ") or "stands-out" into Be ing, and thereby co mes to have an in tel li gi ble "world." But why does Heidegger call the futural ecstema "fu tu rity as such, i.e., pos si bil ity pure and sim ple"? Per haps it is be cause with out death (sig ni fied ap pro pri ately enough by the question-mark in Heidegger's di a gram) there would be no fu tu rity, the pos si bil i ties we press into would not "come back to us," con sti tut ing us. 48 Heidegger's un der ly ing in tu ition-re call ing the fa mous speech of Sarpêdôn in Homer's Iliad 49 -seems to be that futural pos si bil i ties would not mat ter to us if our em bodi ment was not thrown up against the lim its of our own tem po ral fini tude. In other words, death makes the fu ture mat ter, and thus opens the ho ri zon within which we "press-into" the pos si bil i ties which in turn con sti tute us. For Heidegger, then, death is not some thing we em body, but the ineliminable limit of our em bodi ment, the in def i nite but ir re movable ho ri zon within which all em bod ied pos si bili ties un fold.
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The Aporetic Thresh old of Death Derrida's ob jec tion fo cuses on and problematizes the idea of a "limit-line," "threshold," or bor der sep a rat ing life and death, which he ar gues is an aporia im plicit in Heidegger's exis ten tial an a lytic. For Derrida, since Dasein embod ies its pos si bil i ties exi sten tially, and death is "the pos si bil ity of an im pos si bil ity," em body ing the pos si bil ity of an im pos si bil ity would seem to en tail em body ing an im pos si bil ity. Thus Derrida writes: "If death, the most proper pos si bil ity of Dasein, is the pos si bil ity of its im pos si bil ity, death be comes the most im proper pos si bil ity and the most ex-propriating , the most in authenticating one" (p. 77). What are we to make of this ob jec tion?
Obliquely re call ing Kafka's "Be fore the Law" par a ble (from The Trial ) and Blanchot's "The Mad ness of the Day," 51 Derrida's read ing ap peals to "an ex pe ri ence" (pp. 14, 32) "where the fig ure of the step is re fused to in tu ition, where . . . the iden tity of one self and there fore the pos si ble iden ti fi ca tion of an in tan gi ble edge-the crossing of the line-be comes a prob lem " (p. 11). For Derrida, Heidegger's phe nom en ol ogy of death (the "au then tic" con cep tion of death or "prop erly dy ing" [ eigentlich sterben ]) tac itly re lies on the cross ing of this thresh old (the "vul gar" or "common" con cep tion of "per ish ing" [ verenden ] ) and thus con ceals an " aporetic struc ture" which, once ex posed, threat ens to tear apart the log i cal and performative co he sion of Be ing and Time . 52 For Derrida, even the faith ful must ad mit of the log i cal pos si bil ity-al though we should not for get that Heidegger is talk ing about ex is ten tial rather than log i cal pos si bil ity-that death is the end, the ces sa tion of ex pe ri ence. But, to fol low Derrida's logic: if this pos si bil ity should in fact ob tain, if death turns out to en tail the ces sa tion of ex pe ri ence, and I can not ex pe ri ence the ces sa tion of ex pe ri ence, then, strictly speak ing, my death does not hap pen to me. Derrida for mu lates this point pro voc a tively: "here dy ing would be the aporia , the im pos si bil ity of be ing dead, the impos si bil ity of liv ing or rather 'ex ist ing' one's death" (p. 73). Sim ply put, we can not erad i cate the pos si bil ity that we can not ex pe ri ence death. 53 This pos si bil ity clearly re calls Epicurus' maxim that "Death is noth ing to us; since when we ex ist, death is not pres ent, and when death is pres ent, then we do not ex ist." 54 If death is the end of ex pe -ri ence, and I can not ex pe ri ence the end of ex pe rience (for to set a limit is to be in some sense already be yond it, Hegel teaches us), then I can not ex pe ri ence my own death. Thus, even when I die, my death does not hap pen to me. I never meet my death.
Fol low ing Blanchot, Derrida tends to read this rec og ni tion (of the im pos si bil ity of my death's hap pen ing to me) not as lead ing to the con tentment of Ep i cu rean ataraxia , but rather as an ag oniz ing form of dam na tion. This tragic im pos sibil ity of death leads to an ex is tence which more closely re sem bles that of the cursed vam pire (who can not die) than the blessed An gel (who need not die). This "im pos si bil ity of be ing dead"-rather than con fer ring me with a kind of "mor tal im mor tal ity" in an "eter nal mo ment of the now" (as on Heidegger's read ing of Zarathustra 's rec og ni tion that it is never not now )-leads to what Derrida calls "ru in ation," "the fi nal im pos si bil ity of dy ing, the di sas ter that I can not die, the worst un hap pi ness."
Why is this "mor tal im mor tal ity" suf fered or, at best, "en dured" as a kind of di sas trous ruin? The Heideggerian ex pla na tion would seem to be as fol lows. In the search for some thing that is uniquely my own ( eigen ), my re la tion ship with my own death, in its " mineness " [ Jemeinigkeit ] and " irreplacability " (the fact that no one else can die in my place), seemed to hold out to me a last prom ise of "au then tic ity" [or " ownmostness ," Eigentlichkeit ]. But the rec og ni tion that I never meet with that which is uniquely my own leads the quest for au then tic ity to ward a re al iza tion of the tragic im pos si bil ity of death , the trag edy-as "Blanchot con stantly re peats"-"of the im pos sibil ity, alas, of dy ing" (p. 77). Not even my own death will be mine. This read ing is dra matic and pow er ful, but is it com pel ling as a read ing of Heidegger's text?
To rec og nize that it is a com pel ling read ing, but not a con vinc ing cri tique, it is im por tant to be clear about some thing which Derrida does not make clear. Heidegger in sists that: "Dy ing is not an event; it is a phe nom e non to be un der stood exi sten tially." 55 Heidegger treats death not as an oc cur rence that hap pens to us, but phenomenologically, in terms of its show ing-itself as phenom e non. Phenomenologically, death is the unknown; like Be ing as such, death does not show it self di rectly. It is for pre cisely this rea son that Heidegger writes in the Beiträge : "Death is the high est and out er most wit ness of Beyng [ das höchste und äußerste Zeugnis des Seyns ]." 56 Because Heidegger is do ing a phe nom en ol ogy of death, his ex is ten tial an a lytic does not rely on the pos si bil ity of ex pe ri enc ing "the mo ment" of life's ces sa tion. "When Dasein dies," Heidegger writes, "even when it dies au then ti cally-it does not have to do with an ex pe ri ence [ Erleben ] of its factical de mis ing [ Ableben ] ." 57 But if Be ing and Time does not rely on our be ing able to ex pe rience the "in stant" of death, then the ex is ten tial an a lytic can not be "brought to ruin" by the impos si bil ity of ex pe ri enc ing this in stant. Derrida's stir ring ideas about the " disauthenticating ," "disappropriating ," im pos si ble ex pe ri ence of death turns out to be Blanchotian themes read into Heidegger's text. 58 Nev er the less, Derrida suc cess fully opens a pro voc a tive new read ing of Be ing and Time for us here; he raises poi gnant and mov ing ques tions which, though they do not un der mine Heidegger's own ex is ten tial anal y sis, cer tainly de serve to be much more fully elab o rated as philo soph i cal con tri bu tions in their own right. And, not sur pris ingly, there are mo ments in Aporias where Derrida clearly seems to rec ognize this. Thus, de spite pre sent ing what he takes to be a dev as tat ing cri tique, Derrida nev er the less ac knowl edges that there is some thing pro found in Heidegger's phenomenological in ter pre ta tion of death worth pre serv ing. He finds, in the end, that Heidegger's ex is ten tial anal y sis of death con sti tutes "a pow er ful and uni ver sal de lim i tation" (p. 80). Derrida's al ter na tive to Heidegger's in de fen si ble "priv i leg ing" of the on to log i cal entails re-situating Heidegger's sup pos edly ahistorical ex is ten tial anal y sis of death within "the Judeo-Christiano-Islamic ex pe ri ence of death to which the [ex is ten tial] anal y sis tes ti fies" (p. 80). In this way Derrida would historicize with out dis solv ing the performative sta tus of phenomenological at tes ta tion or tes ti mony [Bezeugung ] (the meth od ol ogy of Be ing and Time ), even tak ing such phenomenological tes timony as a par a digm for the most de fen si ble meth od olog i cal strat egy of rea soned jus ti fi ca tion avail able to post-Heideggerian thought.
Wit ness to Death
Derrida could thus be seen as ini ti at ing nothing less than a rad i cal reconceptualization of "legit i ma tion" via a prom is ing re newal of an an cient par a digm of ethico-political ad ju di ca tion, a strate gic meth od ol ogy of ar gu men ta tion which Derrida calls sim ply "tes ti mony." It is in terms of Derrida's re turn to the richly evo ca tive thematics of "the wit ness" that his read ing of the im pos sibil ity of death casts a new and re veal ing light on Heidegger's think ing. As he made clear in his 1994 Irvine sem i nar, Derrida thinks of death as the in stant that shat ters the il lu sion of in stan taneity (our feel ing of ex ist ing in an "eter nal moment of the now"), sep a rat ing "the wit ness structure" into its two com po nent parts or "mo ments," wit ness ing and bear ing wit ness. I take it that here Derrida is in ter pret ing Heidegger's no tion of Ereignis , " en-ownment ," the com ing-together of Be ing and hu man be ing ac cord ing to which human in tel li gi bil ity "hap pens." Ac cord ing to Heidegger's think ing of Ereignis , be ings be come in tel li gi ble once tac itly in ter preted as some thing; be ings show up ac cord ing to a pre-existing (on tolog i cal) un der stand ing of Be ing ("the clear ing") which tac itly fil ters their show ing-up.
This originary dou bling (or "fold")-in which things show them selves only af ter first be ing implic itly in ter preted ac cord ing to the dom i nant historico-cultural un der stand ing of Be ing-is rechristened by Derrida as " ineviterability ." Like Heidegger's un der stand ing of " enownment " (upon which it is clearly mod eled), 59 Derrida thinks of ineviterability as con di tion ing the very pos si bil ity of in tel li gi bil ity. But, in the case of death, this originary dou bling is shat tered, and "the con di tion of pos si bil ity be comes a con di tion of im pos si bil ity." Here death is thought as "the last in stant" which can be wit nessed, per haps, but not sub se quently borne wit ness to-thus ef fectively split ting "the wit ness-structure" into its two "mo ments" ("dis crep ant," as he wrote in Grammatology , "by the time of a breath"). 60 But it is pre cisely by think ing it as shat tered against the im pos si ble in stant of death that this "structure" of enownment or ineviterability be comes vis i ble. In this sense, Derrida's deconstructive alter-cation with Be ing and Time grants us ac cess to the phe nom e non which the later Heidegger calls "the gen tle law of Ereignis ," 61 the in conspic u ous oc cur rence of the tacit but con stant inter pre tive fil ter ing which con sti tutes the in tel li gible, and this is a great ser vice in deed. Heidegger punc tu ates-a Lacanian might say punctures -his claim that the cer tainty of death is the originary cer tainty of be ing-in-the-world with an odd state ment: "Tod ist je nur eigener ." I say "odd" be cause here death (der Tod ), in the nom i na tive mas cu line and with out the def i nite ar ti cle, does not di rectly im pli cate a sub ject. "own" ( eigen plus the strong end ing -er ), then this suggests a "one" (as in "one's own"). But strictly speak ing, there is no "one" in this clause, no im pli ca tion of a sub ject of death. Is this a de nial in the midst of the bold est pos si ble as ser tion of cer tainty? Far from it; death stands alone at the head of the in ter rup tion, with out even the usual ar ti cle (der ) to cush ion its im pact. Granted, if je is used ad ver bially, it could in ti mate many cases of death (ap par ently the read ing both trans la tions rely on)-but Heidegger holds that the Stoic-sounding ex pres sion: "one dies," is it self a com mon form taken by our gen eral cul tural de nial of death. How then are we to in ter pret-in the sense of the originary in ter pre ta tion which un der lies ev ery trans la tion (the über setzung of the über setzung )-this seem ing syntac ti cal in dif fer ence of death?
In Aporias , Derrida pur sues the irony im plicit in the lo cu -CAN I DIE? tion "one's death" into a prom is ing realm of thought, point ing out the "non-relational" char ac ter of death; an authen tic re la tion to death is sup posed to "in di vid u ate" Dasein pre cisely from out of its hav ing fallen in with "the one" ( das Man ), an on to logi cally bad crowd. This of course dis re gards Heidegger's in fa mously dis in gen u ous pro test to the con trary-Heidegger's claim that, for ex ample, when he writes "vul gar" he does n't mean to con note churl ish and rude, but only com mon . One per sua sive way to un der stand Heidegger on this point is that taken by Dreyfus, who has shown that the line be tween the base line con for mity nec es sary for a shared un der stand ing of the envi ron ment bleeds quite eas ily into a "dan ger ous Let us re turn to the con crete ques tion of the best trans lation of "Tod ist je nur eigener ." If we em ploy a col lo qui al ism, per haps: "death is just al ways your own" sounds all right, al though it still en tails an un war ranted sup ple men tary pro noun ref er ence (which is why it sounds a bit too third-personal; the same prob lem be fell M&R's trans la tion of das Man as "the They"). And this and sim i lar trans la tions are called into ques tion if Derrida is cor rect that " 'ownmost' fails to de fine or trans late the re la tion between eigen and eigentlich " (4/27/94) ("own," " ownmost " and least proper trans la tion, pre cisely as es sen tially in terrupted, un satis fy ing, and in com plete, marked by mul ti ple im pro pri eties, is the "most just" "trans la tion." "Most just," given that my in abil ity to find les mots justes, my in abil ity to choose (marked by the pe riph ra sis, hy phen ation and brack et ing) whether to em pha size je nur , "al ways just", or the strange eigener , "own," "own-most," "most [one's] own," which it self stems from an an tip a thy to ward her meneu tic vi o lence and an at ten tive ness to the ques tion of how to think and trans late " eigen ," this sememe which plays such a prom i nent role in some of Heidegger's most im portant "terms of art" (e.g., Eigent lichkeit , Er eignis ) is thus ar gu ably an in abil ity to make a choice which in fact should not be made, an in abil ity stem ming from the ne ces sity of "keep ing the ear open," and thus a prin ci pled re fusal to give a sim ple di rec tive as to how to hear: "Death is al ways most/just eigener ."
If the in tu ition be hind my (in)de ci sion is right, Heidegger needs for us to try to hear the full est res o nances of eigen -the root of the polysemic syn tagm " eigener ." If a trans la tor im me di ately con fines the word to what may well be its dom i nant mean ing-as the "proper" task of the trans la tor no doubt calls on us to do-then its full range is not heard (which points to the sub tle se man tic leg is la tion qui etly ef fected by the work of trans la tion). Derrida frequently il lus trates the point that with think ers such as Nietz sche and Heidegger, think ers who (like Derrida himself) of ten write in sev eral se man tic reg is ters si mul taneously and thereby rely on a reader's "ear" for polyvalence and homology, it is of ten "im por tant not to choose be tween these mean ings" (5/4/94). Here Derrida is re spect ing Heidegger's gen eral (but in fi nitely de mand ing) re quire ment of thought ful trans la tion, viz. that ev ery "über setzung " rest on a prior " über setzung " ( Parmenides , trans. Schuwer and Rojcewicz [Bloomington: In di ana Uni ver sity, 1992], p. 12; here af ter PAR), that, in other words, the car ry ing-across of mean ing into the new transla tion de pends on the trans la tor's pre vi ously hav ing been trans ported into the "in dig e nous" realm of mean ing (which de mands more than that we al ready un der-stand what it is that we are trans lat ing).
3. Al though I will not be pur su ing these themes as they show up in Freud's work, I should men tion that this "op po si tion" as stated is rather su per fi cial. A Freud ian could, for ex ample, make the case that the pri mor dial cer tainty Heidegger evokes is rec on cil able with an un con scious be lief in the im pos si bil ity of one's own death. But such a case seems fairly im plau si ble, given the un re lent ing an tip a thy Heidegger dem on strates in the Zollikoner Seminare (Frank furt a.M.: Klostermann , 1987) to ward Freud's concep tu al iza tion of the un con scious. In ad di tion to his usual cri tique of the meta phys i cal un der pin nings of "con sciousness," Heidegger ar gues-rather un per sua sively-that Freud was forced to pos tu late the ex is tence of an "un conscious" be cause of his "na ive ac cep tance" both of the Carte sian as sump tion of an iso lated ego (stand ing over-against an ex ter nal world of ob jects) dom i nant in the nine teenth cen tury phi los o phy of con scious ness, and of the nat u ral sci en tific par a digm's im plicit de mand that expla na tion take the form of a fi nitely delineable chain of cause and ef fect. Since the iso lated ego so con ceived cannot give a caus ally grounded ac count of its own acts and in ten tions, and since the two prior as sump tions taken together ne ces si tate that such a full ex pla na tion should be given, an "un con scious" is pos tu lated to fill the gap between "con scious ness" and agency (p. 260). How ever one may feel about Heidegger's quick dis missal of the un conscious (in ret ro spect, who was be ing naïve here?), the Levinas calls the "this-sidedness" of death. But this brings up an im por tant point. When we ex pli cate Heidegger's distinc tive sense of "pos si bil ity," we will come to re al ize that Heidegger's def i ni tion of death as the "pos si bil ity of an im pos si bil ity" does not ex plic itly make the above acknowl edg ment. Heidegger is not say ing that death is only pos si bly the end of ex pe ri ence; for Heidegger, it is certainly the end (to sim plify: pos si bil i ties are em bod ied for Heidegger; in ter preted phenomenologically, "death" marks or lim its the end of em bod ied pos si bil i ties). But if we re mem ber what Hegel has taught us about "the limit,"
we should rec og nize that death, as a limit, both does and does not be long to the en sem ble that it de lim its (and hence can not be en tirely purged of its "other-sidedness"). If Levinas of ten crit i cized Heidegger's ex is ten tial an a lytic for priv i leg ing the "this-sidedness" of death over its "other-sidedness," Derrida's Aporias can be seen as fleshing out this crit i cism; for it is this in erad i ca ble "pos si bil -ity" (in the or di nary non-Heideggerian sense) that death, as the limit of life, does not be long en tirely to life, that gives Derrida's cri tique its bite.
6. Derrida holds that a symp tom can not, prop erly speak ing, bear wit ness. He con ceded that one's bear ing might, never the less, bear wit ness. This is a ten sion he ex plores at length in " Geschlecht II: Heidegger's Hand," trans. 1, 1979) , it is par tic u larly ironic. Flew's com ments, quoted at length on the back of the mono graph, read like a lit any of ressentiment -driven vit riol: "Paul Ed wards per forms here an ideal hatchet job, pa tient, sym pa thetic, schol arly, exhaus tive, some times very funny, yet in sum ut terly dev astat ing. For it is not his fault but his find ing that in the end-de spite all the pre ten tious buildup, the ver bose appear ance of pro fun dity, the con stant sound ing cho rus of de vout ad u la tion-Heidegger has here, and per haps elsewhere too, ab so lutely noth ing to say which is true and not tru is tic , im por tant but not false." An ideal hatchet job ? (Don't worry An glo-American phi los o phers, Heidegger has ab so lutely noth ing to say ; you need n't bother read ing him.) where it was pre ceded by: "What phi los o phers do not under stand is that. . ."
10. As I will ar gue, Heidegger and Derrida both pro vide answers to the ques tion of the philo soph i cal sig nif i cance of death, and do so in ways that are both rad i cally dif fer ent and fun da men tally con nected (the lat ter build ing on a prob lem atic but pro voc a tive in ter pre ta tion of the for mer).
How ever, to rig or ously make the case for their dif fer ence within connectedness (we could say their iden tity and differ ence) one would have to treat not only Derrida on
Heidegger on death (and thus bor ders, de lin ea tion, and finally ar gu men ta tive jus ti fi ca tion it self), but Derrida's other im por tant in ter pre ta tions of Heidegger, on tem po rality and the tra di tion, on spirit, the earth, art and home, on the hand, sub jec tiv ism and animality, on hear ing and the voice of the friend, on nam ing and neg a tive the ol ogy, and, per haps most im por tantly, on the pre-attunement of the Zusage more fun da men tal than (or, to take Heidegger at his word, al ready meant by) the "pi ety" of ques tion ing (OWL, p. 72). Nev er the less, any se ri ous reader of Derrida must come to terms with the pro found in flu ence
Heidegger has had on Derrida be fore hop ing to grasp the sub tle but im por tant distanciations Derrida ef fects via his im ma nent cri tiques.
11. Which makes Derrida a the o rist of her i tage, of the re lation ship to fa ther, fa ther land, and Law. Our cy ber netic age of un prec e dented re pro duc tive tech nol ogy-an era of intense strug gle be tween pro phy lac tics and pro mis cuity-has taught us that if each gen er a tion loses some of the res o lu tion of its pre de ces sor(s), it also picks up cer tain irre duc ible prop er ties of its own. Derrida notes that "gen er ation"-in its full est pos si ble polysemy-is ar gu ably one of the better trans la tions for the ti tle of his se ries of es says on Heidegger, Geschlecht I, II, III (un pub lished), and IV (see "Heidegger's Hand"). No sin gle word will be able to cap ture the full gamut of mean ings of Geschlecht (e.g., the or gans of gen er a tion, sex, race, na tion al ity, gen der, en gender ing, etc.).
If Derrida is now gen er ally re garded as one of the most im por tant post-Heideggerian think ers on the con tem porary philo soph i cal land scape, less well rec og nized is the fact that he is also the phi los o pher who has done (and is still do ing) the most to bring the Freud ian and Heideggerian dis courses into a pro found Auseinandersetzung , an al ter ca tion ex tend ing far be yond the im por tance both grant to an ex pe ri ence of the unheimlich at the heart of the fa mil iar. As he said dur ing his 1994 Irvine Sem i nar: "De spite com pe ti tion and in compat i bil ity, both [Freud and Heidegger] are nec es sary. This is the ne ces sity of two deconstructions in prog ress, two ways of trans form ing the space-the eth i cal, ju rid i cal, testi mo nial space-in which to day we live and die, al though we can not ig nore the de ter mi na tion of the 'day'; the phenom en ol ogy of the 'here, now' is pre cisely what these two in ter pre ta tions are dis put ing. It is the Zeitraum that is being con tested" (5/4/94).
12. I have cho sen "al ter ca tion"-from the Latin altercâr-ri , "to con tend with ' an other [ al ter ]'"-to trans late "Auseinandersetzung ," and "al ter-cation" to ren der the hyphen ated " Aus-einander-setzung ." A Heideggerian alter-cation is a crit i cal en coun ter the goal of which is to "set-another-out," to al ter or "make (an)other" that which it con fronts and to "set-out" or es tab lish that "(an)other." Like the Ger man " einander " (which means both "an other"
and "an other"), the Latin al ter con tains within it an im portant "am bi gu ity" [ Zweideutigkeit ]; for, thought in terms of "sim i lar ity," al ter means "an other" or "a sec ond," but, thought in terms of "dif fer ence," it means "other" or "changed."
13. There is much to be said about these re mark able words. That Derrida-a thinker fa mous for, among other things, sub vert ing the priv i lege of speech over writ ing-spoke these words gives any care ful reader pause for thought.
Where might there be quo ta tion marks, in flec tions, empha ses? (These same con sid er ations also ap ply to my ci ta - 3) whereby the writ ings are founded on a par adox, the par a dox of death which Aporias so pains tak ingly draws? Rather than guess ing his in ten tions, ar gu ably a very un-Derridean her me neu tic strat egy, one would no doubt do best to tease out the full im pli ca tions of the polysemic phras ing, trac ing the links be tween these phonemes cast very pub licly into the world.
14. How did Heidegger get in be tween Derrida and his death? If this pa per were to fo cus on the ethico-political as pects of Derrida's read ing of Heidegger, we would also have to ask (no doubt with less im pro pri ety): How did death get between Heidegger and Derrida?
15. Vari a tions on this def i ni tion can be found in many of Derrida's re cent works.
16. The trans la tion of Aporias in jects an in trigu ing el e ment at this point, for the am bi gu ity of the Eng lish word "cer tain" in Derrida's "cer tain pos si bil ity of the im pos si ble" al ready an tic i pates the crux of Derrida's cri tique of Heidegger. Though in say ing so I've al ready run out ahead of my self here, I will try to catch up to this fore-running ( vor-laufen ).
Heidegger holds that we have al ways al ready run out ahead of our selves; like the Ger man sol diers charg ing from the trenches in World War I, we're con sti tuted by the "al ways al ready ahead-of our selves" re vealed in the forerun ning ( vorlaufen ) toward death. I will ar gue that the main mis take Derrida makes stems from think ing that
Heidegger re lies on an over tak ing of death, a cross ing of this ul ti mate ho ri zon of pos si bil ity. If that were in fact the case, it would mean that, as Derrida al leges, Heidegger com mits him self to an un ten a ble re li ance on a think ing or ex pe ri ence of "the im pos si ble as such."
17. " Le Pas sage des frontièrs ," at Cerisy-la-Salle .
18
. A polysemy Derrida clearly in tends. As he ex plained in re sponse to a ques tion I put to him dur ing his 1994 Sem inar on the wit ness and tes ti mony: "Tes ti mony is aporetic , which does not mean im pos si ble. The aporia blocks the way, but this im pos si bil ity of go ing through is still the condi tion of walk ing, it is con sti tu tive of the step [ pas ]. Undecidability is the con di tion of de ci sion. Undecidability may seem to sus pend any de ci sion, any choice, but it is the con di tion of the pos si bil ity of choice. If you al ready knew there would be no choice. Choice requires that you go through the undecidability ; the aporia is a nec es sary step" (4/12/94). 20. In stead, the reader who fol lows Derrida through this maze of tex tual in vo lu tions bears wit ness to an in ge niously par adox i cal rhe tor i cal strat egy cal cu lated pre cisely to defy calcu la tion. Derrida's re sis tance to meta phys ics is em bod ied in this stead fast re fusal to be cap tured by any cal cu lus, caught in the noose of the theoreticist's dream of per fect systematicity . But such a re fusal pres ents pro found problems for an ex e gete. In Aporias , Derrida's con tin ued decons truc tion of the meta phys i cal pre sup po si tions of Be ing and Time leads him once again along a pre car i ous path between the theoreticist ed i fices of meta phys ics and an abyss of mean ing less ness.
21. Per ishing names "the end ing of that which lives" [ das Enden von Lebenden ]" (S&Z 247/B&T 291).
22. Such a "dis cred it ing" is philo soph i cally un dermined-but also psy cho an a lyt i cally mo ti vated (since it is a "gen er a tional al ter ca tion" af ter all)-by the very prox -im ity of Derrida's " aporetology " to Heidegger's phe nomen ol ogy of death, and thus the debt of the for mer to the lat ter, the gift call ing for an even greater coun ter-gift (a structuralist theme that Derrida ex plores at length in 
Der Tod ist ein möglichkeit der schlechthinnigen Daseins unmöglichkeit (S&Z 250/B&T 294)
. We need to get clear about Heidegger's use of "pos si bil ity" in or der to un derstand Heidegger's ad jec ti val us age of schlechthinnigen ; I have ren dered it as "very," M&R and Stambaugh both mislead ingly trans late it as "ab so lute," and Derrida seems to want to say "as such." The point that I think all could agree on is that this par tic u lar "im pos si bil ity" is some how de fini tive of im pos si bil ity for Dasein, it con sti tutes some sort of ex em plar or priv i leged case of the im pos si ble.
26 27. Ap par ently re fer ring to Heidegger's as ser tion that it is the "re la tion to death in which Dasein's char ac ter as pos si bility lets it self be re vealed most pre cisely" (S&Z 249/B&T 293), Derrida writes that "death is pos si bil ity par ex cellence." This too is more than a bit mis lead ing.
28. We could ex trap o late a fur ther claim from this one; namely, that a fail ure to un der stand what Heidegger means by "pos si bil ity" will leave any ex e ge sis of the phenomenological anal y sis of death (as the pos si bil ity of an im pos si bil ity) hope lessly con vo luted. 37. "As long as it is, Dasein al ways has un der stood it self and al ways will un der stand it self in terms of pos si bil i ties. Further more . . . the un der stand ing does not grasp the mat ically that upon which it pro jects-that is to say, pos si bil i ties. Grasping it in such a man ner would take away . . . its very char ac ter as a pos si bil ity, and would reduce it to the given con tents that we have in mind; whereas pro jec tion, in throw ing, throws be fore it self the pos si bil ity as pos si bil ity, and lets it be as such. Dasein … is its pos si bil ities as pos si bil i ties" (S&Z 145/B&T 185). 42. At the root of the modal fal lacy Derrida com mits is a subtle and in it self in noc u ous sub sti tu tion. In B&T, as we have seen, Heidegger de fines our phenomenological re la tionship to death as "the pos si bil ity of an im pos si bil ity." But in OWL-in an anal y sis which Derrida ex plores in Aporias -the "mor tal" is de fined (in con tra dis tinc tion to "the an i mal") by the re la tion (pre sum ably through language) "to death as such." Taking "mor tal" and "Dasein" as equiv a lent ex pres sions here (ar gu ably a jus ti fi able move, but one that as prom i nent a Heideggerian thinker as Reiner Schürmann ar gues against, and which would thus seem in need of some de fense), Derrida im plic itly puts the two def i ni tions to gether-sub sti tut ing B&T's "the pos sibil ity of an im pos si bil ity" for OWL's "death"-to yield the fol low ing: Dasein is de fined by its re la tion to "'the pos sibil ity of an im pos si bil ity' as such." So far, no log i cal er ror. The prob lem arises when Derrida trans forms this new defi ni tion by il le git i mately shift ing the scare-quotes, sub tly re ar rang ing these sen tries at the bor ders of mean ing. It is as if Derrida thinks that "(the pos si bil ity of an im pos si bil ity) as such" and "the pos si bil ity of (an im pos si bil ity as such)" were log i cally equiv a lent ex pres sions; they are not. The for mer is the po si tion sup ported by com bin ing 62. This con tri bu tion is made greater by the fact that it is a short step from rec og niz ing Ereignis to rec og niz ing Being. For, ac knowl edg ing both that we tac itly in ter pret the in tel li gi ble ac cord ing to meta phys i cally pre de ter mined on to log i cal pa ram e ters, and also that these meta phys i cal pa ram e ters pre-filtering "what-is" have a his tory, leads to a rec og ni tion of that which for the later Heidegger al ways ex ceeds and thereby makes pos si ble each of these his tor ical ep ochs of in tel li gi bil ity (and the pos si bil ity of a non-nihilistic futural clear ing), namely, Be ing, the "always-outstanding," the "never-autochthonous" (as Heidegger puts it in PAR). It seems es pe cially fit ting that read ing Derrida on Heidegger should lead us here; for was not the rec og ni tion of Be ing the goal to ward which Heidegger's "on to log i cal de struc tion" in Be ing and Time (so in flu en tial on Derrida) was on the way ? (Re call, e.g., Heidegger's fa mous claim that: "We un der stand this task as one in which, tak ing the ques tion of Be ing as our clue , we are to de cons truct the tradi tional con tent of an cient on tol ogy un til we reach into and re cover those pri mor dial ex pe ri ences in which we achieved our first ways of de ter min ing the na ture of Being-the ways that have guided us ever since" [S&Z 22/B&T 44].) In ret ro spect, is not Derrida's fa cil i ta tion of this rec og ni tion-both of "Be ing" (un der stood as the in effa ble source of his tor i cal in tel li gi bil ity) and of the phenom e non of " enownment " or " ineviterability " by which "Be ing" is tac itly in ter preted and so made in tel li gible-Derrida's own an swer to Be ing and Time 's "call" for an "on to log i cal de struc tion"? Thus, while Derrida's deconstructions of Heidegger have un doubt edly responded crit i cally to this call, they have nev er the less managed to re spond so as to il lu mi nate the texts to which they re spond in sur pris ing and im por tant ways. (And, as Derrida likes to say, the re sponse is the be gin ning of respon si bil ity.) Uni ver sity of Cal i for nia, San Diego, CA 2093-0119 PHILO SOPHY TODAY
